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SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION:
A SCHELLING POINT
MARTIN EDWARDS†
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a reality television game show where two contestants begin the game in two different places in New York City.1
The object of the game is for the two contestants to find each
other, but they do not know anything about each other and they
have no way of communicating. If they succeed, both contestants
win a prize. If they fail, they get nothing. With no ability to explicitly bargain over the meeting, the parties have to make an
educated guess about what the other person is most likely to do.
Most people, confronted with this sort of tacit coordination game,2
will attempt the meeting at a major New York City landmark
such as the Empire State Building.3 Absent any other clues as to
the optimal equilibrium meeting point, both parties choose a
place that is imaginatively unique and intuitive, expecting that
the place will also be unique in the other’s imagination.4 The
Empire State Building stands out not because it is a particularly
optimal meeting place, but rather because it is iconic, nearly syn†
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participants in the University of Chicago Legal Scholarship Workshop, the
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comments. A special thanks to the editors at the St. John’s Law Review for their
insightful comments and efforts in editing this paper. Any remaining errors are
mine. This Article was funded through the Mississippi College School of Law
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1
See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 56 (rev. ed. 1980).
2
See infra Section III.A. This coordination game was actually played on
television, and all but one pair of teams found one another. See AVINASH K. DIXIT &
BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THE ART OF STRATEGY: A GAME THEORIST’S GUIDE TO SUCCESS
IN BUSINESS AND LIFE 110–11 (2008).
3
DIXIT & NALEBUFF, supra note 2. Many of Schelling’s students chose Grand
Central Terminal at noon. SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 55 n.1. Schelling supposed
this was because he was teaching at Yale at the time, and therefore residents of New
Haven would think of Grand Central Terminal as the first place they would go if
they traveled from New Haven to New York. See id.
4
SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 54.
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onymous with New York City itself. This is called a “focal point,”
or “Schelling point,” after Professor Thomas Schelling.
There are two important observations that arise from the New
York City game: first, that people can coordinate without communication and, second, that value-creating outcomes5 can be
achieved despite multiple equilibria6 and high transaction costs.7
As to the former, the fact that many more people than would be
expected by chance would likely collect the prize illustrates that
coordination without communication is possible.8
The latter is more interesting because most real-life coordination occurs with some communication. Thus, logic might suggest that if communication were permitted, the parties would
simply bargain to an optimal solution.9 It could be that one contestant started at Columbia University and the other at Arthur
Ashe Stadium, the optimal meeting point was actually equidistant between the two, and the optimal meeting time was around
5:18 a.m., when traffic on the streets was at the lowest.10 But,
even in explicit bargaining contexts, the bargainers still, far more
often than logic would dictate, fall back on logically irrelevant
but imaginatively simple solutions.11
Part of the reason for this is that real-life coordination, perhaps unlike the New York game, involves some degree of embed5

“Value-creating” is the term used here because, importantly, focal points do
not always lead to optimal outcomes. Law-and-economics, like economics, has long
concerned itself with finding the optimal. Some definitions are formal statements of
economic efficiency (e.g., Pareto efficient, Kaldor-Hicks efficient), while others are
intuitive (e.g., appropriate level of corporate manager attention to voluntary efforts
at protecting the environment). Similarly, some argue that optimality is derived
from measures of utility or wealth, or that free exchange defines and begets utility
and wealth. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 6–7 (1996).
6
In the New York game, any meeting place could be a “winning” equilibrium.
7
See N. Gregory Mankiw, New Keynesian Economics, in THE CONCISE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 379, 381 (David R. Henderson ed., 2008). Here,
transaction costs are the cost of negotiating a meeting place if communication were
available. See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 20–21, 23
(1982).
8
E.g., SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 114 (describing the situation where two
spouses lose track of each other in a store and must coordinate to find each other
and go home).
9
See, e.g., id. at 50.
10
See Ben Wellington, Quantifying the Best and Worst Times of Day To Hit the
Road in NYC, I QUANT NY (Aug. 5, 2014, 12:34 AM), https://iquantny.tumblr.com/
post/93845043909/quantifying-the-best-and-worst-times-of-day-to-hit [https://perma
.cc/6Q5D-AN4K] (finding that the lowest-traffic time of day in New York City is 5:18
a.m., which is when taxis were able to maintain the highest average speed).
11
SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 67.
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ded conflict.12 Both sides want to get the best deal possible for
themselves which, while the transaction as a whole will make
both sides better off if a deal is reached, does not mean there is
not a conflict over who gets the greater share of the surplus created by the transaction. That conflict, in turn, makes the commitments proposed in the explicit bargain less than credible, as
they might be made out of strategic motive to capture more of the
surplus rather than one of facilitating the exchange. In a sense,
this diminishment in credibility devolves the explicit bargaining
back into tacit bargaining, because communication that lacks
credibility is likely to lead to the same place as not communicating at all: settling for a Schelling point or not making a deal.13
The other reason is that discovering and implementing these
optimizations is costly. Once the bargain reaches the stage where
continuing to optimize gets too costly—either strategically or
otherwise—the parties can, and often do, choose the logically
irrelevant and perhaps suboptimal, yet contextually intuitive,
solution to break the strategic deadlock or forgo the additional
costs.14
Finally, a word on what makes a point contextually intuitive.
One way is physical or geographic uniqueness—the Empire State
Building is very tall and associated in the popular mind with
New York City. Another way is that once bargainers agree on a
Schelling point as the way to conclude their bargain, they will
return to it in future bargains—again, to avoid costs.15
These, then, are the primary features of Schelling points:
they permit coordination in high-transaction-cost, multiple-equilibrium environments because they are contextually intuitive.
They are value-creating, though not always optimal—that is,
another equilibrium might be more optimal by a given measure,
but the one that is contextually intuitive makes coordination
easier and more likely. They may be contextually intuitive due
to some characteristic—for example, the Empire State Building’s
association with New York City—or due to having been productively used to coordinate people in prior dealings, or, often, both.16
12
See generally Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1033 (2006). Of course, one party could always push the other to come to her location
or a location more convenient for her.
13
See SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 67; see also David Friedman, A Positive
Account of Property Rights, 11 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 1, 13 (1994).
14
See SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 67.
15
Friedman, supra note 13.
16
See infra Sections IV.B.1–2.
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A Schelling point is an intuitive, if imperfect, place for bargainers
to conclude a bargain where a suboptimal bargain is superior to
no bargain at all.
Shareholder wealth maximization is the norm within corporate law and governance holding that directors’ and officers’ roles
are, fundamentally, to maximize the long-term value of the corporation, and thus the value of its shares of stock.17 The debate
over whether it is or should be the norm or the law for corporations is usually contested on different theories of economic or
social value, and, of course, legal precedent.18 The extant lawand-economics theories of corporate law view shareholder wealth
maximization as an efficient term in a hypothetical bargain
between corporate managers and directors on one side and
shareholders on the other side.19 The argument goes that it has,
by reason of this efficiency, emerged as the law.20 Competing
theories rest on a rejection of this “contractarian” theory of the
firm due to empirical results that run counter to the theory,
persistent counterfactuals that undermine the norm’s existence,
and scant hard precedent for the norm.21 At times in the wideranging academic and public debate, commentators have called
for dividing managerial focus among wealth maximization and
other matters such as worker wealth, environmental sustainability, and other nonfinancial social concerns.22

17
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 245 (3d ed. 2015); PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (AM. L. INST.
2008). But see Eric Franklin Amarante, What We Talk About When We Talk About
Shareholder Wealth Maximization, 19 TRANSACTIONS 455, 459–62 (2017) (illustrating the complexity buried just within the words “shareholder,” “wealth,” and
“maximization”). One of the myriad debates that involves shareholder wealth
maximization is about what it actually means. See id. at 459.
18
Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75
S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1192, 1199–1202 (2002).
19
Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v.
Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 177, 185 (2008).
20
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 120–21.
21
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1428
(1993). See infra Section II.A; Stout, supra note 18, at 1192–93, 1208 (stating that
ownership and residual claimant theories are “empirically incorrect” and “false”);
Ann M. Lipton, What We Talk About When We Talk About Shareholder Primacy, 69
CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 863, 868–69 (2019) (proposing the different hypothetical
desires of shareholders that may be in conflict with increasing the value of the
residual claim).
22
Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of
Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409, 1411 (1993).
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This Article, purposely, does not stake a position on whether
shareholder wealth maximization is socially optimal, or whether
expanding corporate governance to include greater focus on other
matters would be better. Instead, it reflects on the role the norm
plays in coordinating people and money. It strives to illustrate
that shareholder wealth maximization “works” because it is a
contextually intuitive way to coordinate within the high-cost,
multiple-equilibrium bargaining environment associated with
large public corporations.
Capital is necessary to run a corporation and generally, corporations cannot obtain enough capital from debt-financing
sources. For that reason, they must sell stock or equity. That
arrangement, like all the other contracts that make up the
corporation, must consist of some kind of bargain. This Article
proposes that selling stock or equity is an arrangement of the
kind Professor Schelling describes—a coordination game with
embedded conflict.23 Given the practical impediments to actual
bargaining, the value of coordinating investment and resolving of
conflicts between the shareholders and the managers and
directors by settling on shareholder wealth maximization is
reflected in the fact that this bargain is so often struck. One way
to describe this process is as Professor Schelling did—that there
was something contextually intuitive about the idea of
maximizing shareholder wealth.
Everyone who might want to invest in any corporation or run
one understands, in general, what it means for a corporation to
orient itself toward maximizing shareholder wealth.24 The key
observation is that the shareholders recognize, generally, that
managers and directors are going to be trying to maximize
wealth. This recognition is independent of any individual shareholder’s actual desires or purposes, regardless of whether those
desires or purposes are advanced or frustrated by the norm—that
is, even if shareholders wanted managers and directors to do
something else, they generally know that managers and directors

23
See also Manuel A. Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 540, 582 (1995) (describing the bargaining between individual
shareholders and the managers as a tacit bargain of the kind Schelling analyzed).
24
This is not to say that every person’s actual decisions in any given transaction
or case will be in alignment. It just means that the concept of focusing on maximizing corporate wealth is relatively simple. Cf. Lipton, supra note 21, at 891–92.
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will be trying to maximize wealth.25 This sheds some light on
why it might have emerged as the norm for animating director
and officer conduct in the beginning, why it has been enshrined
in the law in Delaware and elsewhere, and why it continues as a
norm today. In sum, I hope this Article answers the question:
Why is shareholder wealth maximization so persistent, even
granting its inefficiencies, shortcomings, and even granting its
occasional failure to result in anyone’s wealth being maximized?
The posited answer is that shareholder wealth maximization’s
contextual intuitiveness has resulted in its becoming a loadbearing part of corporate governance. It is persistent for its
usefulness, if not always preferred for its optimality. In the
hypothetical bargain between the managers and directors on one
side, and the shareholders on the other, shareholder wealth
maximization represents a value-creating, if not always optimal,
equilibrium.
It is important to add that the public is taking a more keen
interest in the role of corporations in society.26 Many view
shareholder wealth maximization as socially harmful, or, at
minimum, a powerful impediment to social progress or change.27
While describing shareholder wealth maximization as a Schelling
point is not the sort of idea that would necessarily respond to
calls for reform premised upon the need for social change,
understanding its persistence should be a part of the debates to
come. There is no doubt that the economics, social value, and
legal doctrine will be up for debate over the next few years, but
the debate will be incomplete without a full account of the norm’s
coordinating function. This Article, hopefully, contributes part of
such an account.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Following this Introduction, Part II provides a brief overview of the extant theories of
the firm, the way these theories interact with existing doctrines,

25

Cf. SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 58–59 (discussing how one person would
“grimly acknowledge” that he or she must go to the other if the only location that
both recognize is where the other person is located); Lipton, supra note 21, at 867.
26
David Gelles & David Yaffe-Bellany, Shareholder Value Is No Longer Everything, Top C.E.O.s Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019
/08/19/business/business-roundtable-ceos-corporations.html [https://perma.cc/3SDTJJKU].
27
See generally Addisu Lashitew, Building a Stakeholder Economy, BROOKINGS
(Oct. 28, 2020) https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2020/10/28/buildinga-stakeholder-economy/ [https://perma.cc/PG75-FAC7].
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and the most competitive alternative models. It then situates
shareholder wealth maximization within that constellation of
theories. Part III describes the provenance of Schelling points,
how they arise from the existence of multiple equilibria and
transaction costs, and how their coordinating power arises from
their objectivity and intuitiveness. Part IV explains how the
simple, intuitive idea of shareholder wealth maximization fits the
definition of a Schelling point. It presents the core argument of
this Article: that shareholder wealth maximization serves as a
load-bearing coordinating function due to its contextual-intuitiveness that exists alongside, and perhaps even independent of, its
current justifications. That is, shareholder wealth maximization
being a Schelling point that solves the costly bargaining problem
in corporate law explains its persistence, if not its superiority.
Part V is a brief conclusion.
II. THE THEORY AND DOCTRINE OF
SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION
Shareholder wealth maximization has a complex doctrinal
and theoretical history. Debates about it have been going on for
quite some time.28 As a descriptive matter, there are debates
over whether the norm truly exists at all and whether it is a
binding legal principle or not. One Delaware judge has answered
this question with the claim that the norm is so doctrinally sound
as to be very nearly beyond reasonable questioning,29 and a
recent Delaware case reached the same conclusion.30 Normatively, the primary justifications for shareholder wealth maximization are that it is economically efficient31 and socially useful,32
28

See infra Section II.A; see also George A. Mocsary, Freedom of Corporate
Purpose, 2016 BYU L. REV. 1319, 1320 (“Every few decades, there erupt political and
academic debates over the proper nature and purpose of the corporation.”).
29
See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the
Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 768 (2015)
[hereinafter Dangers of Denial]. Nonetheless, Judge Strine has recently distributed
a new paper arguing for formally changing much of this quite substantially. See Leo
E. Strine, Jr., Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism: A Comprehensive Proposal
To Help American Workers, Restore Fair Gainsharing Between Employees and
Shareholders, and Increase American Competitiveness by Reorienting Our Corporate
Governance System Toward Sustainable Long-Term Growth and Encouraging
Investments in America’s Future 4 (U. Pa., Inst. for L. & Econ. Rsch., Paper No. 1939, 2019).
30
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34–35 (Del. Ch. 2010).
31
“Economically efficient,” for the moment, refers collectively to traditional
principles of welfare economics, along with the contributions of transaction costs
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and that it is generally equitable to shareholders and other
parties to the corporate contract.33 Similar justifications include
the cost-saving value of off-the-rack corporate default rules,
which are premised upon the proposition that such rules should
reflect what a majority of hypothetical bargainers would choose
in a costless environment.34 The private ordering or bargaining
that results as individuals contract around these defaults—or do
not—reveals the most economically efficient terms.35 The prevailing view of corporate law is “contractarian”; corporate law
and governance consists of a nexus of interlocking contracts
between various corporate constituents, not all of which are
formally or extensively bargained.36 In particular, the contract
with the shareholders of a large, public corporation is typically
not bargained at all.37
Nonetheless, there is intense debate over whether shareholder wealth maximization is—descriptively—the law in Delaware,38 and—normatively—whether it is actually economically
superior, socially useful, or equitable to animate directors’ and

economics and the new institutional economics. See William W. Bratton & Michael
L. Wachter, Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 489, 499
(2013); see also Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1210
(1984) (drawing upon transaction costs economics to develop a framework for
“contractual governance” between directors and shareholders).
32
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. L. REV. 547, 549 (2003).
33
At least one commentator has suggested that fairness follows from the overall
economic efficiency gains of shareholder wealth maximization. See Mark J. Roe, The
Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 2063, 2065 (2001); Macey, supra note 19, at 185 (linking shareholder wealth
maximization to the contractarian theory of the firm—that is, that the contract
between the managers and directors on one side, and shareholders on the other,
includes a term obligating the former to increase the value of the residual claim,
since that is the only thing that the shareholders bargain for).
34
See Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 1430–31 (defending, simultaneously, the
shareholder wealth maximization norm and limited liability as transaction-costsreducing default rules within the corporate form); see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
supra note 5, at 15. To some extent, this Article’s contribution hopefully will be to
show that Schelling points represent the mechanics or plumbing of individuals
working around the transaction costs they find in markets.
35
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 34–35.
36
Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 1427.
37
Green, supra note 22, at 1413–14; see also Utset, supra note 23.
38
See, e.g., Stout, supra note 18, at 1189–90; Bainbridge, supra note 21, at
1423–25 (“Delaware’s courts and legislature . . . are still our premier corporate
lawmakers.”).
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officers’ duties with such a legal rule.39 Descriptive arguments
against shareholder wealth maximization include the dearth of
clear doctrinal history supporting it, the lack of clarity in
Delaware cases about the specificity of its requirements, and the
rarity of its direct enforcement due to judicial deference to the
authority of directors and officers.40 Normative arguments include charges that the norm does not necessarily or actually
result in economic efficiency,41 that shareholders’ hypothetical
and real private views of their own wealth and welfare are often
rejected,42 and that maximizing shareholder wealth actually
means imposing costs on other corporate constituents or on
society that are not worth the economic gains.43 Similarly, some
commentators propose that shareholder wealth maximizationdriven corporate governance should be reformed or reinterpreted
such that it takes greater account of workers, environmental
sustainability, and other non-financial social matters. Scholars
have at times theorized this as a “multifiduciary stakeholderist”
model, while popular commentary has described related reforms
as “corporate social responsibility” (“CSR”) or “environmental and
social governance” (“ESG”).44 Collateral debates about the divi-

39
See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. 163, 165 (2008); Green, supra note 22, at 1410–11; Mocsary, supra note
28, at 1321.
40
See Mocsary, supra note 28, at 1354; see also Bernard S. Sharfman,
Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Its Implementation Under Corporate Law, 66
FLA. L. REV. 389, 407 (2014).
41
See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 280–81, 291–92 (1999) (arguing that the economic benefits of the corporate form flow from the conscious allocation of inputs and
outputs by an independent hierarch—the board—rather than the board’s focus on
maximizing the wealth of one class of corporate contributors—the shareholders).
42
See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1025 (1996) (arguing that
corporate law treats shareholders as a legal fiction rather than drawing upon the
actual desires of human shareholders); see also Lipton, supra note 21, at 865–66
(elucidating the shifting sands in corporate law from the assumed desires of
dispersed, uncommunicative shareholders to the actual preferences of institutional
investors and others with expressed preferences). This is thought to undermine the
case for private ordering. Id. at 882–83.
43
See Caleb N. Griffin, The Hidden Cost of M&A, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 70,
110 (without expressly arguing against shareholder wealth maximization,
illustrating the extent to which it could produce social harms previously
underappreciated in traditional law-and-economics scholarship).
44
See generally James Mackintosh, A User’s Guide to the ESG Confusion, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 12, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-users-guide-to-theesg-confusion-11573563604 [https://perma.cc/9Q8S-QTVE].
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sion of authority between management and shareholders,45 policing conflicts of interest,46 the question of whether wealth is to be
maximized in the short- or long-term,47 and, as always, whether
the decision maker should be the state or the private parties
themselves48 also interact with discussion of shareholder wealth
maximization.
Purposely, this Article does not claim to move the ball one
way or another on these debates. Certainly, the contractarian
case for shareholder wealth maximization is formidable. Skeptics, though, have made persuasive arguments and presented
thoughtful alternative models. CSR/ESG reformers and the
theorists who came before them also bring significant ideas to the
table—ideas that corporate managers themselves are now arguably taking seriously.49 Instead, this Article hopes to further the
understanding of the function and operation of the shareholder
wealth maximization norm by describing it as a Schelling point.
This Section combines the component parts of any discussion
of corporate law and governance: the theory of the firm as developed through economics and finance, the models developed in
the legal scholarship, the scholarship on the shareholder wealth
maximization norm itself, and the relevant doctrine.
A.

Economic Theories and Legal-Economic Models of the
Corporation

The modern theory of corporate law and governance is a heavily economic one—in many ways the economics have overshadowed the doctrine, even as Delaware and other states have
tended toward guiding the doctrine toward the economics. At the
outset, it is important to note that shareholder wealth maximization largely operates in the background of much of the economic

45

See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REV. 833, 836 (2005).
46
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 277–78 (1931); see also Bebchuk, supra note 45.
47
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood
Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System,
126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1884 (2017).
48
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine,
57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 84–85 (2004).
49
See, e.g., Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug.
19, 2019), https://system.businessroundtable.org/app/uploads/sites/5/2021/02/BRTStatement-on-the-Purpose-of-a-Corporation-Feburary-2021-compressed.pdf [https://
perma.cc/H73W-VQGJ].
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theory.50 This is in part because, as this Article has called it,
shareholder wealth maximization might better be thought of as a
norm51 than a binding—or default52—legal principle.53 It is, in
fact, one of the many grounds on which the varying debates on
shareholder wealth maximization take place.54 This Part makes
an effort to corral all of these competing ideas, by providing a
background in the current state of shareholder wealth maximization, the norm and the law, through a brief overview of the
economic theories and legal doctrine associated with it.
Today’s corporate law and economics begins with Professor
Ronald Coase’s The Nature of the Firm, in which he argued that
transaction costs—described in that article as the costs actors
must incur to use the price mechanism—cause individuals to
gather into firms to carry out economic activity.55 Perhaps
implicit in Professor Coase’s work was that this was done
according to contract-like agreement.56 Professor Coase observed
that the economics of the time seemed to take as a given that
either a firm or an individual could be “the” economic actor for
the purpose of analyzing supply, demand, price, equilibrium, and
allocation of resources questions.57 Professor Coase wondered
why individual economic actors would choose to act collectively as
a firm under the command and control of a boss or entrepreneur.58 Indeed, command-and-control was supposed to be the
model competing with the market, where economic actors were
thought to constantly be responding to prices transmitted through
these market processes.59 But Professor Coase observed individ-

50

See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,
306 (1976) (noting that corporate managers don’t always “literally” maximize
wealth).
51
Joan MacLeod Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of
Statutes, Decisional Law, and Organic Documents, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 939, 939
& n.1 (2017) (citing JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES
KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 32–33 (2008)).
52
Mocsary, supra note 28, at 1342–43.
53
The doctrine is discussed more thoroughly in Section III.D, infra.
54
See Mocsary, supra note 28, at 1342.
55
R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390–92 (1937).
56
See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 783–84 (1972).
57
Coase, supra note 55, at 387. Then and now, the study of economics is about
the allocation of resources. N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 2 (9th
ed. 2021).
58
Coase, supra note 55 at 388.
59
Id. at 390.
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ual people inside firms responding to commands through a hierarchy, where the person at the top was the one who responded to
the prices.60
Professor Coase concluded that no economic actor can participate directly in the market process of responding to prices
without expending some sort of cost.61 If that cost became too
great, then the economic actor could not avail herself of the
economic benefits of an exchange at the market price. Thus,
firms formed and entrepreneurs, on firms’ behalf, acted upon the
prices developed in the market process. Since Professor Coase
proposed his theory of the firm, scholars have been working to
develop a model of how law and economics work together to
manage the transaction costs Professor Coase first observed.
Following Professor Coase, Professors Armen Alchian and
Harold Demsetz published their seminal work, “Production,
Information Costs, and Economic Organization.”62 They described the firm as a “contractual structure” that developed to
“enhanc[e] efficient organization of team production.”63 Professors Alchian and Demsetz provided one of the first formidable
efforts at answering the questions Professor Coase’s observations
first raised, as well as presenting their own set of questions.64
Their exploration of the firm defined it as a set of contracts
where a central agent serves as the common counterparty in
contracts with all the inputs of production. While Professor
Coase focused on the costs associated with individuals using the
market, Professors Alchian and Demsetz expanded the analysis
to include the increased productivity created through “team
production.”65 They also developed a framework for analyzing
the extent to which firms must expend costs on monitoring employees and trying to prevent them from shirking, a natural
problem in any team productive activity. Their quibble with
Professor Coase, if they had one, was Professor Coase’s framing
of the firm as somehow an “authoritarian” process instead of a
“contractual” one.66 For the purposes of this Article’s claims, the
most important concept was the connection between what

60
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62
63
64
65
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Id. at 390–91.
Id. at 392.
See generally Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 56.
Id. at 794.
Id. at 783–84.
Id. at 779–81.
Id. at 783.
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Professor Alchian and Demsetz called the “central agent” and the
“residual claim”67—that is, that the party holding the residual
claim would be best incentivized to monitor the other inputs
because that party is best incentivized to get the most surplus
out of the team productive activity.68
Professors Michael Jensen and William Meckling, along with
Professor Eugene Fama, continued crafting the theory, illustrating that the voluntary but authoritative system wherein managers and directors exercised wide discretion was the most efficient
way to organize collective economic activity.69 Professors Jensen
and Meckling’s most important proposition was that the corporation was a “nexus” of contracts between the various factors of
production.70 This suggests the shareholder wealth maximization
norm is a term of the implicit contract between the managers,
directors, and shareholders.71 That is, corporate shareholders are
trading investment capital to the firm in exchange for a slice of
the residual claim, and, therefore, they should reasonably expect
the managers and directors to maximize the value of the residual
claim. Professors Fama and Jensen’s later work developed an explanation for why splitting the residual claim and assigning its
monitoring function to the board of directors was a workable
solution to the agency costs Professors Alchian, Demsetz, Jensen,
67

The “residual claim” refers to the person who gets the surplus after all other
inputs have been paid. As Professors Alchian and Demsetz described the capitalist
firm, the shareholders would be the residual claimants, as they stood to benefit the
most from income produced over and above what all other parts of the team are paid.
68
One question Professors Alchian and Demsetz puzzled over, but did not quite
answer, is how the splitting of the residual claim from the central monitoring agent
and distributing it among a lot of shareholders in a corporation would serve to
discipline the monitor for shirking his or her responsibility to discipline the other
inputs. When the central agent is the residual claimant, incentives are, of course,
aligned, and the right to the value of the residual claim disciplines the central
monitoring agent. Professors Alchian and Demsetz observed that the shareholders
would certainly not take any authority with their piece of the residual claim, and
instead suggested that stockholders are basically just more optimistic bondholders.
In the end, the connection between the open-ended residual claim and the central
monitor suggests that the central monitor’s expected role is to increase the value of
the residual claim. Professors Alchian and Demsetz credit Professor Henry Manne
with the proposition that no shareholder would expect any sort of control. See also
infra, Section II.A (discussing Manne); Williamson, supra note 31, at 1224–29.
69
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 50, at 310. Professors Jensen and Meckling’s
robust new economic explanation of the boundaries of the firm undermined the prior
legal scholarship of Professors Berle and Means, who had argued that agency costs
were and would continue to wipe out any gains from incorporation. See Bratton &
Wachter, supra note 31, at 494–97.
70
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 50, at 310.
71
Id. at 311 & n.13; see also Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 56, at 777, 794.
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and Meckling had all been considering.72 In other words, while
the shareholders would have the best incentives to monitor all
the inputs, they will not because their individual share of the
residual claim is so small and their relationship to the corporation itself is so attenuated. So the corporation places that
monitoring authority in the hands of the board of directors.
Professors Jensen and Meckling’s work connected to Professor Coase’s, as it appeared to identify the boundary of the firm
and the market by framing it in terms of the “agency costs”73
associated with the “nexus of contracts” underlying the legal
fiction of the corporation.74 In the end, similar to Professors
Alchian and Demsetz, Professors Jensen and Meckling concluded
that the nexus of contracts associated with the firm was the way
that “conflicting objectives of individuals . . . are brought into
equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations.”75 The
engine of the analysis was a reframing of agency costs: rather
than follow, for example, Professors Adolph Berle and Gardiner
Means’s assumption that the positive quantity of agency costs
ensured inefficiency, Professors Jensen and Meckling concluded
that if the value of the production exceeded all relevant costs—
including agency costs—then joint production through firms was
still wealth-enhancing.76 Finally, Professor Oliver Williamson
also contributed a key observation to the research on corporate
governance. He explained why the residual claimants should be
the principal and the managers and directors the agent—that is,
because other creditors all could negotiate the terms of their
arrangements, while the widely dispersed shareholders, who
have little interest or ability to actually manage the corporation,
cannot or simply do not negotiate the terms of their participation
in the firm.77
Professor Henry Manne contributed a well-developed legal
model of the large, public corporation that presaged much of the
economics and finance literature discussed above. In “Our Two

72
Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control,
26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 308–09 (1983).
73
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 50, at 310.
74
Fama & Jensen, supra note 72, at 302.
75
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 50, at 311.
76
Id. at 328 (citing Professor Demsetz’s “Nirvana” fallacy to reject claims that
high agency costs would wash increased productivity from equilibrium organization
of inputs).
77
Williamson, supra note 31, at 1228.
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Corporation Systems: Law and Economics”78 and “Mergers and
the Market for Corporate Control,”79 Professor Manne argued, in
part, that shareholders in large public corporations with freely
tradeable shares were simply suppliers of investment capital.
The management and control of the corporation were not the
shareholders’ concern; they only wanted a return on their investment. Professor Manne rebutted Professors Berle and Means’s thesis that shareholders were left out of control of the corporations
in which they had invested by saying there was no reason that
ordinary shareholders would or should expect to have any right
of control over the corporation. Professor Manne’s fundamental
contribution was that shareholders are merely capital providers,
not discretion-wielding entrepreneurs. Professor Manne’s explanation greatly influenced the later work of Professors Frank
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, as he argued that the legal
structure of large, public corporation law reflected the economics
of specialized managers deploying capital from investors not
particularly interested in management anyway.80
Then-Professor Easterbrook81 and Professor Fischel’s series
of articles, and later book, represented the summation of the
impact of all the economics work on the law and had the
profound effect of fully establishing the “contractarian” view of
the corporation. Professors Easterbrook and Fischel argued that
the peculiar economics of collective business activity resulted in a
corporate law that accurately reflected those economics and that
this result was normatively good.82 Consistent with their contractarian view, Professors Easterbrook and Fischel also contributed the most thorough argument that corporate legal rules
should be default rules. The default rules, in turn, should be
discerned from what a majority of participants in markets for
corporate shares would want and that mimicked that market’s
selection of contract terms.83 Professors Easterbrook and Fischel
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Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA.
L. REV. 259, 264 (1967).
79
Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110, 112 (1965).
80
Manne, supra note 78, at 261.
81
Later, Professor Easterbrook would become Judge Easterbrook.
82
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 4. Professors Easterbrook and
Fischel and Professors Alchian and Demsetz naturally found substantial influence in
the earlier work of Professor Henry Manne. See supra text accompanying notes 79–
80.
83
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 15.
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bridged the economics to the law, ultimately concluding, as
Professor Manne had, that the law reflected the economics.84
Among the strongest modern contributions to the contractarian view of the firm is Professor Stephen Bainbridge’s “director
primacy” model. Professor Bainbridge’s work squared a rather
stubborn circle in corporate law: Why, if the shareholders were to
be the privileged class in corporate law, do courts give so much
discretion to directors and managers? Shouldn’t shareholder
wealth maximization imply greater shareholder power?85 Of
course, Professors Easterbrook and Fischel concluded, consistent
with Professors Jensen and Meckling and others, that this was
economically efficient. Professor Bainbridge, though, mapped this
directly onto the law, describing the intricate statutory and
doctrinal connections that reflect the economically efficient separation of ownership and control.86 While the ends of corporate
governance could be to ensure shareholder wealth, the means of
doing so—as Professors Jensen and Meckling illustrated—was to
vest power in an entrepreneur with command-and-control
authority, as Professor Coase first observed. In the Delaware
corporation, the entrepreneur is the board.87 Consistent with this
legal model, Professor Bainbridge has also done some of the most
incisive work on majoritarian default rules and hypothetical
bargaining.
Often, shareholder wealth maximization is defended on the
grounds of the hypothetical bargain.88 Likewise, the economic
theory of default rules is that they are divined by reference to
what a majority of people would want if they lived in a frictionless world with unlimited time, capacity, and resources to
bargain.89 This is also sometimes referred to as the “hypothetical” bargain. Along with the hypothetical bargain comes the
notion that a majority of bargainers bargaining over the same
term would reach a certain, efficient term. A further extension of

84

Id.
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 452–53 (2001).
86
Bainbridge, supra note 32, at 559, 572–73; see also Williamson, supra note 31
(the board of directors is a special-purpose vehicle for managing the contract
between the residual claimants and the corporation).
87
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2002). The board, likewise, serves Professors
Fama and Jensen’s monitoring function. See Fama & Jensen, supra note 72, at 303.
88
Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 1430.
89
Id.
85
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this theory is that actual bargains may reflect the appropriate
default term and that evidence of majoritarian default suitability
should be obtained by such observation, whether those bargains
were “outcome” only observations or come with evidence of the
parties negotiation over the term.90 At minimum, it would appear, shareholder wealth maximization might be thought of as
the default corporate purpose under the law-and-economics,
hypothetical bargaining model of the corporation.91
B.

Other Models

1.

Shareholder Primacy

Shareholder primacy is not an alternate model to shareholder wealth maximization, as it holds that shareholders are the
privileged class in the corporation. As Professor Bainbridge
describes, shareholder primacy and director primacy serve the
same end: the maximization of shareholder wealth. Shareholder
primacy, though, tends to reach back to Professors Berle and
Means, suggesting that greater shareholder power is necessary to
truly give effect to shareholder wealth maximization. Professor
Lucian Bebchuk is the most prominent shareholder primacy
advocate, and his work reflects a view not necessarily in tension
with shareholder wealth maximization, but rather with how to
get there.92 Taking up the challenge from Berle and Means, who
ultimately thought that great managerial authority within the
corporate form would result in the shareholders’ wealth never
being maximized, Professor Bebchuk’s proposed reforms aimed at
giving shareholders more actual control through more substantial voting rights, director independence, and other shareholder
control devices.93 Contrary to Professor Bainbridge, Professor
Bebchuk proposes that shareholders themselves, rather than
managers and directors, are in a better position to turn their own
interests into corporate policy, especially where managers are
using their power to feather their own nests or consume other
private benefits of control.94

90
91
92
93
94

Id. at 1428–29.
See Mocsary, supra note 28, at 1342.
See Bebchuck, supra note 45, at 838.
Id. at 836–37.
Id. at 898–99, 911–13.
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Team Production

Distinguished from Professors Alchian and Demsetz, who referred to the firm as a model of team production, Professors
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout developed what is now known as
the “team production” model of corporate law. In that model, the
board is a “mediating hierarch” that connects and manages all of
the factors of production needed for the team production.
According to Professors Blair and Stout, Professors Alchian and
Demsetz’s analysis stopped short of a very important question
about the nature of team production: How does it grow, change,
or recede over time?95 Moreover, how should the firm account for
firm-specific investments in human capital? The answer to these
questions, and others, led Professors Blair and Stout to conclude
that corporate purpose, as executed by the board as mediating
hierarch, was to find the best and most efficient way to produce
whatever goods or services the corporation was producing, rather
than serving shareholders—or anyone else, for that matter. The
unique and searing insight is that corporations need not be run
in the interest of any one constituent to be run well; they just
need to be run well.
3.

Multi-Fiduciary or Stakeholderist

The multi-fiduciary stakeholderist model originated with Professor E. Merrick Dodd’s response to Professors Berle and Means,
but it largely caught literary fire among scholars of management.96 The normative claim is that all “stakeholders” have
intrinsic value to the corporation and therefore are worthy of
management’s consideration.97 As Professor Ronald Green put it,
when contrasting the stakeholder model with the prevailing
shareholder wealth maximization model, “[t]he difference will
become apparent whenever corporate decisions arise in which
acting on moral, as opposed to legal, responsibilities to other
constituencies cannot readily be justified in terms of long-term
shareholder gain.”98
This fundamental idea is foundational to the more political
theories of CSR and ESG. It likely underpins, for example, 2020
95

Blair & Stout, supra note 41, at 275.
See generally Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of
the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 65
(1995).
97
Id. at 67.
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Green, supra note 22, at 1419.
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United States presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren’s plan to
create a federal chartering system for very large corporations.99
It certainly motivated the Business Roundtable’s late-2019 statement that signatory CEOs would be sure to keep stakeholders in
mind when making corporate decisions.100 It is not entirely clear
whether the Roundtable meant that CEOs would do so because
that is best for the shareholders in the long run, or, as Professor
Green prescribes, would do so even when it is not best for the
shareholders.101
Team production, stakeholderist, and modern social responsibility initiatives reject shareholder wealth maximization, whether
on legal, moral, or economic grounds.
C.

Doctrine: Dodge, eBay, and Whether Shareholder Wealth
Maximization Is a Binding Legal Principle

Shareholder wealth maximization as a matter of law is
complex. Several scholars have recently tried to put together the
sparse case law with statutes and other sources of corporate
operational law in a rigorous effort to link all these sources of
corporate law to the shareholder wealth maximization norm.102
Unavoidably, the doctrine leaves these scholars a bit wanting for
a good definition of shareholder wealth maximization, how it is
implemented, whether it is of mandatory legal force, and if it is,
what the law actually requires. This Section tours the seminal
cases, blending in some of this recent work and how it interacts
with the cases.
The seminal case on shareholder wealth maximization is
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,103 a 1919 decision of the Michigan Supreme Court. It held:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for
the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to
be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be
exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not
extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits,
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Accountable Capitalism Act, ELIZABETH WARREN (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www
.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Accountable%20Capitalism%20Act%20One-Pager
.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3GA-QBJW].
100
See Gellas & Yaffe-Bellany, supra note 26.
101
Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 1433.
102
See, e.g., Heminway, supra note 51.
103
170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
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or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order
to devote them to other purposes.104

The dispute in the case involved whether Henry Ford, as a
director of the Ford Motor Company, had violated his fiduciary
duties by retaining the corporation’s substantial earnings instead
of distributing them to shareholders.105 Part of Ford’s rationale
was that he intended, basically, to continue growing the business.106 Another part involved lowering the prices of Ford
automobiles and otherwise running the business as, according to
the court, “a semi-eleemosynary institution and not as a business
institution.”107 The court permitted what it apparently viewed as
a legitimate business expansion, but sought to chasten Ford in
his vision of a corporation run for the good of the “general public”
or “to benefit mankind at the expense” of the stockholders.108
Also notable, the court in dicta proposed that it would have
permitted a number of actions that seemed to enrich other stakeholders.109 It gave the example of permitting Ford to build a
hospital solely to treat sick and injured Ford employees, which,
naturally, would result in a great expenditure of the surplus that
the court ultimately ordered to be distributed to the Dodge
brothers and the other shareholders.110
Dodge has been subject to scholarly criticism and alternative
interpretation. Professor Stout’s admonition to corporate law
professors, “Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford,” is the
best reflection of the criticism of Dodge. For starters, Professor
Stout notes that the language quoted above is only dicta, undermining any claim that Dodge accurately reflects a principle of
corporate law.111 Dodge’s second major strike is that courts rarely
enforce a purpose of wealth maximization directly and often
expressly permit directors to make decisions that have a dubious
or contrived relationship to shareholder wealth. The same goes
for corporate charters and statutes. Finally, Professor Stout
104

Id. at 684.
Id. at 670–71.
106
Id. at 671.
107
Id. at 683.
108
Id. at 684.
109
Id. at 683–84.
110
Id. at 684.
111
Stout, supra note 39, at 167–68. Professor Stout also categorizes Dodge as
weak precedent because of its age and the fact that it was decided outside Delaware.
The holding of the case, according to Professor Stout, essentially is that Henry Ford,
as a controlling shareholder, oppressed the Dodge brothers, thus violating the duty
the controller owes the minority. Id. at 166–68.
105
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rejects the economic basis of shareholder wealth maximization,
suggesting that privileging shareholder wealth reduces the relative value of debt claims, chills non-shareholder contributions to
team production, and produces externalities to non-shareholder
constituencies. Professor Stout’s rejection of Dodge perhaps suggests it is more avatar than doctrine—that is, to the extent
shareholder wealth maximization is or is not the law, Dodge is
“weak precedent.” Her arguments against Dodge, whether it is
conceived of as avatar or precedent, represent a substantial
criticism of shareholder wealth maximization itself.
As Professor Stout noted, at the time Dodge was decided,
Delaware had not clearly stated as its law that shareholder
wealth maximization was the mandatory or even default
corporate purpose.112 This would largely change a few short
years later, when the Court of Chancery decided eBay Domestic
Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark.113 There, the Court faced a dispute
over several defensive measures Craig Newmark and James
“Jim” Buckmaster had taken to preserve their control over the
corporate future of Craigslist, Inc. Echoing Henry Ford, Craig
and Jim “prove[d] that they personally believe[d] craigslist
should not be about the business of stockholder wealth
maximization.”114
The Chancellor concluded that this was
impermissible, articulating the norm as follows: “[D]irectors are
bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany [the
corporate] form. Those standards include acting to promote the
value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”115
Perhaps former Justice Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court
put it most clearly when he called for a “clear-eyed” acceptance of
the norm as the law.116
D. Why a Renegotiation of the Norm Now?
At one time, some thought that shareholder primacy (at least
as an end of corporate governance, if not necessarily predicting a
means) had reached the end of its history.117 To the extent this
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primacy-framed end is co-extensive with shareholder wealth maximization, it leaves one wondering why shareholder wealth maximization is again an object of public criticism and debate. One
possibility is just that societies change over time, and whatever
moment in time that gave rise to and preserved shareholder
wealth maximization is now simply passing on.118 Another possibility is that the downstream justifications are weakening a bit,
as no one can come to a consensus on the optimal organization of
the corporation in the first place. As Professor Bainbridge aptly
noted a number of years ago, the law-and-economics scholars who
contributed so much to corporate law and doctrine and those
holding onto hope of drawing back on those contributions are
simply talking past one another.119 Finally, as has happened
before, mainstream politics is taking seriously the economic and
social power that has accumulated in very large corporations.
Some have expressed concern that this economic and social power
has inured only to the benefit of these corporations’ managers,
directors, and shareholders and therefore is suspect. Similarly,
others focus on the potential for corporations to use their powers
for the greater good of all constituents, rather than just the good
of those who happen to own shares.
This Article purposely avoids taking positions on these debates, whether the academic one about the nature, provenance,
or desirability of shareholder wealth maximization or the public
one about managing corporate power and influence. Instead,
since both tend to grapple with the meaning, consequences, and
potential for reform of shareholder wealth maximization, I hope
to contribute to the understanding of how the norm works. To
that end, this Article presents shareholder wealth maximization
as a Schelling point: an intuitive and objective norm that permits
productive coordination of economic actors by getting everyone on
the same page.
III. COORDINATION GAMES, SCHELLING POINTS
Economist Thomas Schelling was the first to conceptualize
the focal point, and the concept bears his name in common
118
See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 21, at 867–70 (describing that shareholders are
no longer quiescent and disengaged).
119
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856,
859–60 (1997) (reviewing PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed.,
1995)).
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vernacular.120 He developed it from a strategy he and traveling
companions used to find each other when they might have been
separated.121 Everyone agreed that if anyone got lost anywhere
the party traveled, they would always find each other at the city’s
town hall, police station, or post office.122
Professor Schelling also occasionally tested the New York
City game repeated in this Article’s introduction on his students,
finding often that important landmarks and intuitively selected
times coordinated his students.123 More than a simple game,
Professor Schelling viewed this as a way that people coordinate
their activities, so to reap gains from that coordinated action.124
There is little legal scholarship on whether Schelling points shed
any light on law, but the work that has been done is intriguing.125
For example, Professor David Friedman uses the concept as a
foundation for his work, “A Positive Account of Property Rights,”
arguing that focal points provided a useful theoretical explanation for the existence of property rights, which in turn gave
rise to the ability to contract over them.126 Additionally, Professor Robert Ahdieh aptly argued that boilerplate terms become
focal points that contracting parties can use to obtain strategic
bargaining leverage, thus divorcing the use of the boilerplate
term from its actual meaning and has described the regulatory
state as a source of coordination points.127
A.

Coordination Games

A “coordination game” is a game theory concept where players
in an experiment must coordinate with one another to obtain
prizes. A pure coordination game is one without any conflict.
120

See Interview: Thomas Schelling, REGION FOCUS, Spring 2005, at 36, 36; see
also SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 57, 111.
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SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 55–58.
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See generally Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law,
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Friedman, supra note 13, at 15–16.
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Ahdieh, supra note 12, at 1037. Professor Ahdieh also proposed that boilerplate terms saved on transaction costs, though Professor Ahdieh’s article separates
this from the Schelling point analysis. See SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 67–68
(explaining that people often use past transactions as a framework for future ones);
see also Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the
Regulatory State, 95 MINN. L. REV. 578, 598 (2010) (describing the regulatory
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For example, the New York game show example at the beginning
of this Article is almost pure coordination. That is, each party
wins a declared prize where the total surplus is already split.128
Other coordination games have a conflict component, usually
over how to split a given surplus.129 As Professor Ahdieh explains, all contract bargaining can be viewed as a coordination
game with a varying degree of embedded conflict.130
Coordination games often have multiple—perhaps even very
many—equilibria. To coordinate, the parties must choose one.
Sometimes the payoff is the same regardless of which one they
choose, but other times the payoff might be less if they pick the
“wrong” one. Critically, though, that payoff might be greater
than zero. A Schelling point that results in greater than zero
net131 value from coordination might not be optimal, as there
could be another equilibrium with yet greater value. Even so,
the sum of the value that does exist at the Schelling point and
the avoidance of whatever costs might have been expended to
achieve the optimum being greater than zero suggests a mutually
and socially beneficial exchange, even if it isn’t the best possible
exchange. This, perhaps, often reflects the real world.132
B.

Transaction Costs

In any game with multiple coordination points, there are
three types of transaction costs: the costs of selecting the equilibrium, the costs of implementing it, and the costs of bargaining
over the first two. For example, in the New York City game,133
the parties have to choose a point of coordination and then will
have to expend costs to get from their locations to the Empire
State Building via taxi, rideshare, or perhaps the subway. In the
128
Cooter, supra note 7, at 4. A true pure coordination game would involve the
parties sitting across a table from one another already, trying to divide a dollar bill
or pick a common square. The New York City example admits of the possibility that
there is some conflict about whether to meet closer or further away from one party
or the other. Cf. SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 58–59.
129
Friedman, supra note 13, at 5–6 (“It is in my interest . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
130
Ahdieh, supra note 12, at 1039–40, 1051.
131
The value at the Schelling point will also include a reduction in bargaining
costs. See EASTERBROOK AND FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 34–35 (describing the
economizing effect of legal default rules).
132
See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 50, at 332, 352 (describing how real-life
firm structures reflect the economic benefits, costs, and tradeoffs that exist in the
real world).
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See supra Part I.
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tacit version of the game, where the parties cannot communicate,
the cost of selecting the equilibrium is extremely high and there
are no bargaining costs because there can be no bargaining. The
cost of implementing the Empire State Building solution might
be greater than selecting the equidistant point between them,
but due to the high costs of consciously choosing the point of
coordination, there is no way to reduce them. Such costs do not
necessarily evaporate with full communication, and new costs
emerge. Perhaps the parties would then bargain over the meeting point and that bargaining would include considerations of
each side’s starting location. In this case, choosing a Schelling
point reduces the bargaining costs.
Similarly, in some games, the only solution is for one side to
expend more resources to obtain the nominal prize. Professor
Schelling’s example is a game where two soldiers parachute into
a remote location, but their communication is limited by the fact
that one soldier’s walkie-talkie is only able to transmit whereas
the other is only able to receive. In that case, the typical person
playing the game as the receiving player will grudgingly solve
the game by agreeing that she will make the trek to the location
of the transmitting player who, of course, can transmit her
position to the receiving player.134 One player expends minimal
transaction costs, while the other expends much more. These
scenarios illustrate how Schelling points represent workable, but
perhaps suboptimal, solutions. And that sometimes workable,
suboptimal solutions are superior to no solution at all. In tacit
bargaining, the Schelling point solves the insurmountable problem of literally not being able to agree on the coordination point.
In explicit bargaining, it can solve the problem of avoiding the
costs of continued or deadlocked bargaining.
C.

Multiple Equilibria

A Schelling point is useful if there is more than one potential
solution to a game. That is, there are multiple equilibria. Suppose a person is buying a car from a dealership. The dealership
wants to achieve the maximum purchase price, while the buyer
wants to achieve the minimum. The most the buyer will pay is
$20,000 and the least that the dealership will accept is $18,000.
If the buyer was aware of the dealership’s price and could

134

SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 59.

696

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:671

credibly communicate firmness of her offer,135 she could just offer
$18,000 when she walked in the door and leave with the car. If
the dealership was aware of the buyer’s price and could credibly
communicate firmness of its offer, the salespersons would offer
her the car for $20,000 and she would take it and leave with the
car. Thus, there are equilibria anywhere from $18,000 to $20,000
where the parties would strike a mutually beneficial deal. This
is the surplus that must be divided for the transaction to occur.
From a wealth perspective, any dollar less than $20,000 is
increased wealth for the buyer and any dollar over $18,000 is
increased wealth for the dealership, but regardless of the division
of the wealth, total wealth is the same.
What would you expect to happen? Given two serious buy/sell
offers of $18,000 and $20,000, and since neither side can credibly
communicate the firmness of its offer, the most common outcome
is likely that the two parties would “split the difference” and
make a trade at $19,000.136 This is what Professor Schelling’s
theory would predict—the number equally between the two
bounds is the natural endpoint where both sides are happy but
not worrying about whether either ceded too much surplus to the
other.
Of course, that does not have to be true. Each of the parties
could still work to obtain a bigger slice of surplus residing between the equilibria—that is, they could expend more bargaining
costs.137 What if the dealership were struggling financially and
could use the extra money? What if the buyer were less wealthy
than the dealership owner and the marginal value of each extra
dollar had greater utility to her than the owner? This might
suggest that, from a utility or wealth perspective, relatively
greater utility might exist if one party or the other obtained more
of the surplus, even though the total wealth is the same. Similarly, the parties may dig in, and expend more transaction costs
to either arrive at—or not arrive at—a different equilibrium.
Professor Robert Cooter explained that sometimes the point
at which mutually beneficial cooperation will or will not occur is
a factor of being unable to bargain to an agreement over the
surplus.138 Professor Cooter argued this was true regardless of
135

This is important because, in reality, both sides have reason to believe the
other is bluffing about the firmness of the offer. Friedman, supra note 13, at 6.
136
See SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 67.
137
Cooter, supra note 7, at 17, 20–21.
138
Id. at 4.
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transaction costs and even argued that reducing transaction costs
could have the perverse incentive of leading the parties to play
chicken over the division of the surplus past the point where
cooperation could be reached.
But what Professor Cooter was not seeking to address is how
these bargains actually get done when they do get done. The last
step—the piece of the puzzle that solves the problem—is the
Schelling point, which very often is “split[ting] the difference.”139
Again, it is not necessarily the logical outcome, and in fact may
be logically irrelevant. That is, splitting the difference does not
naturally split the surplus fairly or optimally. It just splits the
surplus. Numerous optimizations could all be constructed into a
precise model—or the parties, facing the costs of continued
bargaining or losing the deal altogether, could just settle on
$19,000, a number both parties intuitively understand as both
increasing their utility and receiving a fair deal.140
D. The Power of the Focal Point—Contextual Intuitiveness
Professor Schelling argued that this phenomenon of bargaining behavior was more than a quirk or random element of human
conduct. His own informal experiments, and several others since,
illustrate the unusually high likelihood that people can and will
solve coordination problems without the aid of communication
and that this extends to circumstances where people can literally
communicate, but cannot effectively communicate sincerity or
firmness.141 In the example above, it is obviously in the car
dealership’s interest to convince the buyer that it will not sell the
car for less than $20,000, even though this is not true, so the
buyer simply might find the salesperson’s claim that it will not
sell the car for less than $20,000 unbelievable. The same is true
of the buyer—the dealership simply might disbelieve her claim
that she will not pay more than $18,000. A small move by either
party will fail to communicate credibility, because both parties
will again conclude the other is not telling the truth. Small
moves in either direction suffer from the same issue. If the dealer simply knocks off another $500 and says “best and final,” the
139

SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 67.
It is also possible that this just does not happen, but that does not undermine
the observation that it must happen quite often. See Donald J. Boudreaux, The
Coase Theorem and Strategic Bargaining, in 3 ADVANCES IN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS
95, 101 (Peter J. Boettke & David L. Prychitko eds., 1996).
141
Friedman, supra note 13, at 5–6.
140
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buyer may simply add $500 to her offer and also say “best and
final,” arguably signaling her disbelief that the dealer’s offer was
not actually its best and final, but failing to signal that her new
offer was her best and final. This, of course, costs the parties
more in bargaining costs. Professor Schelling’s solution is that if
there is a focal point in the bargain, this point is where the
parties can conclude it.142 In this sort of bargain, splitting the
difference between the most recent two “serious” offers usually
gets the deal done.143 Perhaps there indeed was a little bit more
value in either direction—the dealership could have squeezed a
bit more from her or she from it, but the “split-the-difference”
model stands out in everyone’s mind as at least generally “fair.”
IV. THE SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION NORM IS A
SCHELLING POINT FOR COORDINATING DIVIDED OWNERSHIP OF
EQUITY INTERESTS IN BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
Bargaining within the context of the public corporation is
cost-prohibitive.144 In fact, it is not exactly cheap in the nonpublic context either. These transaction costs, were they to be
incurred, might wash the prospect of a deal at all. So, parties
simply do not incur them.145 Instead, they simply do not select
terms and just go into business together on the basis of trust,
unspoken understanding, or just bare incomplete terms.146 Since
the
law-and-economics
revolution
in
corporate
law,
commentators have proposed that the corporate law should
provide off-the-rack default terms to complete corporate
contracts, so that when the corporate bargainers choose to forgo
transaction costs, there will be a clear legal rule for resolving any
dispute that might arise later.147 Such an approach likely reflects
Delaware law and the law in most other states.148 Commentators
have long justified these off-the-rack default terms as the
predicted or observed outcomes of hypothetical or actual
142

SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 70.
Id. at 111.
144
Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 1427−29; see also supra Part I.
145
Ahdieh, supra note 12, at 1071; see Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, The
Inefficient Evolution of Merger Agreements, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 57, 61–62 (2017)
(contesting the notion that business transaction drafting is the result of
“distinctively crafted” final documents).
146
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515
(Mass. 1975).
147
See supra Section II.A.
148
See supra Part II.
143
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bargains, justifying the legal system’s application of such default
terms as carrying out a majoritarian preference.149 That is, as
the process unfolds, efficient rules will be revealed as parties
contract around the default rules, or do not contract around
them.150 Such an explanation is a very good one for why courts
should enforce default rules instead of mandatory rules and is
generally a good fit for the idea that corporations are voluntary
associations of private individuals pursuing private ends, but
critics have argued that some default rules may still be
suboptimal.
This version of law and economics is very persuasive, but so
have been very thoroughgoing critiques.151 Schelling point theory
is not so easy to undermine, in part because it rests less on the
assumptions commonly needed to model allocative efficiency and
at least implicitly concedes that the outcomes may not be the
optimal outcomes. Instead, Schelling point theory suggests that
being a part of the corporate bargain that exists under an
arguably suboptimal shareholder wealth maximization regime is
superior to not participating in the corporate bargain at all.152
Schelling point theory explains why, within the context of
business associations, so many people can coordinate to found
and run so many business ventures without being overwhelmed
by transaction costs.153
This Part describes the process of coordinating capital
investments from large numbers of dispersed and rationally
uninformed investors, the transaction costs associated with that
process, and the multiple equilibria that can be reached within it.
This Part presents this Article’s core argument: shareholder
wealth maximization is persistent because it permits coordination at a productive equilibrium and minimizes transaction costs
due to its objective and intuitive fit within the corporation
context.

149

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 20–22.
Id. at 21–22.
151
See supra Section II.A.
152
Cf. Theodore N. Mirvis, Paul K. Rowe & William Savitt, Bebchuk’s “Case for
Increasing Shareholder Power”: An Opposition, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 43, 44–45
(2007) (discussing the extent to which the United States corporate governance system has “performed admirably”).
153
As Professor Mocsary argued, the corporate form itself could be described as
a Schelling point. Mocsary, supra note 28, at 1338 & n.94.
150
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Coordinating Capital and the Production of Goods and
Services

Large corporations exist because it often takes a large
amount of organized resources to undertake long-term and very
expensive projects.154 These long-term projects take a lot of
money, which is locked in over a long period of time.155 Almost no
individual corporate manager or director, or any other individual
person, has enough capital to contribute in this manner. Even if
an individual person did have enough capital, most people
diversify their holdings and will not put all of their money into a
single large enterprise.156 Likewise, single banks typically do not
commit that level of capital to a single loan, either, as they must
diversify lending risk in the interest of their own shareholders—
not to mention depositors.
One possibility is to conduct all necessary activity for the
production of all goods and services in person-to-person transactions in spot markets, but, as Professor Coase recognized, this
is not feasible.157 Another possibility is for small groups of people
who can communicate and coordinate easily to undertake projects by pooling their capital.158 This may not always scale to the
level needed to conduct such complex activities as cracking
petroleum for ethane or manufacturing commercial aircrafts.159
Thus, large corporations exist, and they simply must accumulate
capital at a rate that requires dispersed public investment of
some kind.
Notably, a “bond” is a specific type of financial contract, the
basic terms of which are well-understood.160 Another way, as
Professor Ronald Gilson once described as the mode of corporate

154
Coase, supra note 55, at 396–97; Blair & Stout, supra note 41, at 322; ADAM
SMITH, 2 AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
278 (George Bell & Sons ed. 1908) (1776).
155
See Stout, supra note 18, at 1194; see also Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as
a Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, and the
Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685, 685–86 (2015).
156
See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 56, at 779, 787–88.
157
Coase, supra note 55, at 387–89.
158
This is the traditional partnership or close corporation model.
159
This is not to say private companies with a large geographic footprint and high
revenues cannot function without dispersed public investment, but even private
investment pools obtain capital at some point in the financing chain from more than
a single person. For example, private equity firms obtain capital from a smaller
number of wealthier investors.
160
It is a transaction-cost-reducing innovation that allows corporations to accumulate capital from dispersed investors.
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operation in Germany and Japan, is to fund large corporations
with equity capital mostly from banks, which have their own engaged managers.161 These banks, of course, accumulate capital in
the form of deposits and other more conservative individual investments.162
Corporations simply must accumulate a large amount of capital and American corporations have typically pursued capital
from many dispersed individual investors.163 With a broad pool of
direct investors, transaction costs begin to emerge on both sides
of the deal. The transaction costs of selling equity—at least in
the manner conducted in the United States—are dealt with, in
part, through the shareholder wealth maximization norm.
1.

Transaction Costs

Within the corporate contract, directors and managers acting
on behalf of the corporation and investors deciding whether to
purchase shares face transaction costs. On the corporation side,
directors have to construct a bundle of economic and control
rights to appeal to investors. In non-public corporations, directors, who are often founders and entrepreneurs, can bargain with
potential investors face-to-face over various economic and control
rights. Directors, upon choosing to offer shares to the public atlarge, can no longer bargain face-to-face with investors.164 Without the ability to actually bargain over terms and conditions of
share ownership, the directors and managers have to make
guesses at what the public wants, and make that the bundle of
economic and control rights they will offer to public investors.
Corporate finance practice has settled on a share of common
stock as having a set of typical economic features, including, for
example, the residual claim and potentially sometimes dividends.165 Different firms may offer different bundles of rights for

161
Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do
Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 327–28 (1996).
162
Mark J. Loewenstein, Stakeholder Protection in Germany and Japan, 76 TUL.
L. REV. 1673, 1678–79 (2002).
163
Nonetheless, “institutional investors” such as pension funds, mutual funds,
and other investment vehicles own a large percentage of the current equity market
capitalization.
164
Green, supra note 22, at 1411–12 (criticizing the hypothetical bargain methodology); see also Utset, supra note 23.
165
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 10–11, 36–37 (discussing the
nature of “stock” and the ways that different governance terms emerge from firms
experimenting with them).
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various reasons—for example, dual-class stock166—but the convergence is striking.167 The feature the directors and officers rarely fail to offer is shareholder wealth maximization as a fundamental norm—in fact, such a norm is the thing that makes the
residual claim valuable.168 Even if the content of shareholder
wealth maximization is not always discernible or optimal, the communication from the managers and directors to the shareholders
that they will be doing their best to maximize the shareholders’
wealth is a commitment that has to be made.169
On the investor side, investors have to figure out what kinds
of companies they want to invest in and what level of risk they
are comfortable taking, and then also find out actual details
about the company and its business. These are actions that
many investors are rationally unwilling to take, both before and
after making investments.170 A bargain that consisted of “invest
your money with us, the professional managers, and we will do
whatever we want with it” would not be expected to earn much
investment at all.171 A complex bargain that rigidly promised a
certain dollar amount of return per dollar invested, or the like,
would be preferred stock or a bond which can be offered with
lower transaction costs, but importantly, with financial returns
limited by their terms.172 Investors who invest in common stock
simply would not, rationally, have any way to bargain with
directors and managers over the terms of their relationship, nor
would directors and managers find it worthwhile to do so.173
166
Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate
Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 806–07 (2017).
167
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 36–37.
168
See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 56, at 789 n.14.
169
Cf. Ahdieh, supra note 12, at 1037, 1062 (discussing how certain terms signal
much more than their actual content).
170
See generally James Martineau, The Importance for Trustees To Understand
Their Tolerance to Investment Risk, 15 TRUSTS & TRUSTEES 626 (2009); Cf. Jeff
Brown, How Investors Can Check for Risk, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.: MONEY (Dec.
10, 2018, 11:27 AM), https://money.usnews.com/investing/funds/articles/how-investorscan-check-for-risk [https://perma.cc/RV7R-VTXY] (exploring the difficulty of assessing interacting risks within a portfolio).
171
Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 1441–43, 1443 n.72 (explaining that shareholders are not a bottomless tap of money for corporations to use for whatever
purposes managers choose which is, of course, true due to market constraints to
some extent, but also due to legal ones).
172
This would not attract “optimistic” investors—or, at minimum, risk-takers—
because the upside is limited. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 56, at 789 n.14.
173
Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 119, at 870–71, 875–76 (providing the example of
a take-it-or-leave-it contract for a rental car as an illustration of “outcome
bargain[ing]”).
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If this were the whole story, then one would never have expected to see large corporations conducting so much business in
the global economy.174 Shareholder wealth maximization solves
this problem because it is a Schelling point for both sides: directors, managers, and shareholders understand that maximizing
shareholder wealth is a fundamental norm. Shareholders commit their existing wealth with the understanding that their
future wealth will be maximized not due to choosing to take a
particular amount in return—like a bond—but through the
increase in the value of the firm that arises through the labor
and efforts of the managers and directors oriented toward the
goal of maximizing that value.175
Firms exist because organizing economic activity into firms
solves some of the transaction-cost problems associated with
bargaining large, costly, risky, and long-term projects, but it does
not solve all transaction costs problems. Bargaining with the
providers of equity capital is cost-prohibitive, so having a
Schelling point reduces or eliminates those costs.176 The firm,
whether in the corporate form or in another business entity form,
reduces transaction costs associated with hiring factors of
production such as purchasing machinery and employing labor.
Likewise, it lowers the transaction costs of obtaining credit.177
But, since the firm uses a lot of equity capital, and trades it for
the residual claim, there emerges a new set of transaction costs
specific to the firm: agency costs.178 Professors Easterbrook and
Fischel, among others, observed that the public stock markets
dealt quite well with these costs. The thesis of their economic
analysis of the corporation was that equity markets would
reward good managers and directors and punish bad ones.179 In
174
Cf. SMITH, supra note 154, at 26 (noting “division of labour” is limited by the
“extent of the market”).
175
See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 56, at 787–88; see also Letter from Warren Buffet, Chairman of the Bd., Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., to Berkshire Hathaway
S’holders at 3–4, 11 (Feb. 22, 2020) (on file with author) (describing the
“compound[ing]” nature of retained earnings).
176
See supra Section III.B.
177
Mocsary, supra note 28, at 1338 (describing the corporation itself as a Schelling
point for gathering and deploying resources).
178
See supra Section II.A. As Professors Goshen and Squire aptly argue, agency
costs are not the only transaction costs associated with the relationship between
shareholders, managers, and directors. Shareholder control devices can create “principal costs” which are also transaction costs embedded in the corporate contract.
Goshen & Squire, supra note 166, at 770–71.
179
That is, lower share prices suggest poor management, and higher share
prices suggest better management, as market participants sold off stocks of poorly
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that process, corporations would adopt the governance forms that
best enabled them to sell stock, and corporations stubbornly
insisting otherwise would sell less stock or see their prices fail to
keep pace with the better-governed firms.
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel’s analysis rests on the
assumption that market prices reflect a level of conscious choice—
which they do. The question is what is the conscious choice? Is it
a choice based on all market participants individually pricing the
substantive features of particular governance forms, or is it some,
perhaps even many, market participants accepting a Schelling
point that happens to contain those substantive features?180 It is
one thing to assume that shareholders are rationally ignorant
but another thing to assume that rationally ignorant shareholders will make so many “good” choices through consciously
weighing and balancing different substantive governance choices.
The connection is the Schelling point. Where there are multiple
choices, but no opportunity to bargain over them, the bargainers
will choose the Schelling point. When corporate governance
could consist of shareholder wealth maximization or some other
purpose or purposes, shareholders and managers and directors
will often, though perhaps not always, alight on the shareholder
wealth maximization norm because it is the intuitive place to
settle the bargain.
2.

Multiple Equilibria

Corporate law is highly flexible and permits shares of
capital stock to be designed with a dizzying array of rights and
benefits.181 In smaller corporations, it is entirely possible for the
parties to construct a bespoke corporation that fits the needs of
everyone involved.182 In a large corporation with many investors,
or with many shares of stock to potentially sell in a liquid market, coordinating this customization would be impossible. This
does not mean, however, that multiple points of agreement would
not be wealth-enhancing for the corporation and the shareholders
alike.

managed firms and bought up well-managed firms. This is also consistent with price
theory’s tenet that prices work like a communication signal—they contain information.
180
Cf. Ahdieh, supra note 12, at 1037, 1053–55.
181
Goshen & Squire, supra note 166, at 798–801, 805–10; see also MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 6.21 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 151, 152 (West
2017).
182
It is unclear whether smaller corporations actually do this.
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As discussed above, scholars, not to mention courts, have
struggled with how to manage divergent shareholder preferences.183 Not every shareholder may desire the decision purported to maximize wealth because, for example, that shareholder’s
individual interests may be harmed separately.184 Or, an investor may wish to maximize her overall utility from all of her
investments, as opposed to maximizing her wealth from her
investments in a number of individual firms.185 But, as Professors Jensen and Meckling described, the corporate nexus of
contracts is how the divergent individual preferences achieve
equilibrium.186 In the sense that Professors Easterbrook and
Fischel developed, the law has developed processes and doctrines
for coordinating the moves to or between equilibria.
Where there are multiple wealth-enhancing equilibria, a new
transaction cost emerges: which equilibrium to choose. A corporate purpose of shareholder wealth maximization is a productive
equilibrium, but this Article grants that stakeholderists and
ESG/CSR proponents may have identified other ones and that
several scholars have raised formidable questions about the
future of wealth maximization in the traditional sense.187 A
corporate governance that takes into account, say, the impact of
corporate decisions on climate change could even be a superior
equilibrium compared to one that focuses on maximizing
financial wealth of the shareholders as a class. The issue is that
the shareholder wealth maximization equilibrium is relatively
more visible, objective, and verifiable than these others.
Similarly, it is more contextually intuitive. At this point, with a
mature corporate law and governance, much of its contextual
intuitiveness could be of the kind that Professor David Friedman
described: it is the rule now because everyone knows it is and has
been the rule.188
To some extent, shareholder wealth maximization is a creature of corporate law, but there is little reason to believe it does
not apply in other entities in some form, and in all forms, there is
some coordinating norm of going into business for the purpose of

183
184
185
186
187
188

Lipton, supra note 21, at 865–67, 888.
Id. at 866–67; see also Griffin, supra note 43, at 79–81.
Heminway, supra note 51, at 944.
See supra Part II.
Heminway, supra note 51, at 970 n.89; Lipton, supra note 21, at 888.
Friedman, supra note 13, at 2.
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earning a profit for those who have gone into the business.189 A
simple example of a two-shareholder, close corporation, which
many states treat more like a partnership,190 represents a relatively low-transaction-costs environment where the two parties
could actually consider the terms of their venture. However,
many cases have arisen, and still arise, where the parties
actually do not bargain over the terms of their relationship.191
While this could be due to insufficient capital to hire attorneys,
Professors Jeffrey Manns and Robert Anderson have illustrated
that even parties with the means to hire attorneys to bargain
over every term of their agreement simply do not do so.192 In
theory, if they did, it might be fair to infer that the bargain
represented the precise desires of both parties and proof of the
mutual benefit of the transaction.193 In fact, the parties do not
actually bargain in a literal or meaningful sense, but they still
reach a deal.194 Critics have taken this as substantial evidence
that contractual principles cannot map precisely enough onto
corporate law to be workable. Thus, a difficult and unsettled
question arises about the efficiency, optimality, or wealthenhancing nature of the choice.195 One way that people have
dealt with multiple equilibria and the lack of optimality is to
choose the one that it is the most contextually intuitive—the
Schelling point. Perhaps the right explanation for why corporate
governance remains fixed upon shareholder wealth maximization
189
For example, the common law definition of a general partnership includes the
elements of two or more people carrying on business together for a profit. UNIF.
P’SHIP ACT § 101 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2019). Partners owe
each other fiduciary duties, animated by the concept that all partners act for the
interest of increasing the wealth of the partnership, of which the partners are
entitled to equal shares. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(b) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON
UNIF. STATE L. 2019).
190
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 510–
11 (Mass. 1975) (citing Ripin v. U.S. Woven Label Co., 205 N.Y. 442, 447 (N.Y. 1912);
Kruger v. Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 802, 805 (N.Y. 1965)).
191
See, e.g., Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 510–12, 515–17; Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d
856, 861–63 (Tex. 2014). But see eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d
1, 11, 19–20, 25 (Del. Ch. 2010) (Parties in a close corporation did in fact bargain
with one another, but they ultimately disagreed and ended up in litigation over
whether the corporation was going to maximize wealth or be a public service.).
192
Anderson & Manns, supra note 145, at 61, 84–85 (discussing that sometimes
changes lawyers make to documents seem to not even reflect conscious choices at
all).
193
Cf. Green, supra note 22, at 1413–14, 1418.
194
Bainbridge, supra note 32, at 578–79.
195
See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1697, 1704, 1707 (1996); Lipton, supra note 21, at 879, 881.
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is not because it is necessarily optimal, but because it is intuitive
and workable.
B.

Contextual Intuitiveness in Corporate Governance

Among the key insights about Schelling points are that they
are contextually intuitive. When attempting a meeting at the
Empire State Building, the parties objectively understand what
it is—and, more importantly, where it is—and easily verify it as a
meeting point. Within a game where the object is to meet in New
York City, there are few places that capture the popular imagination like the Empire State Building.196 This makes it a
contextually intuitive—even poetic197—meeting place when the
players have no way to discern any information about each other.
Again, it is critical to emphasize that meeting at the Empire
State Building is probably not optimal, and in fact, it is likely a
clear case of a non-optimal equilibrium. It’s not centrally located
in New York City, and, depending on where the parties are
starting, it might not be convenient to either of them.
Shareholder wealth maximization has a similar objectivity
and contextual intuitiveness. As Professor Manne described it,
the typical shareholder shows up to the corporate bargain after
the entrepreneurial process has already started and perhaps has
even largely been completed.198 Shareholders provide investment
capital—they do not have any reason to desire any control or
responsibility. They simply want a return on investment. Managers and directors, having completed or greatly progressed in
the entrepreneurship part, are looking for money. So, they offer
to the potential shareholders the residual claim, along with the
only available objective and contextually intuitive implied promise: to increase the value of that residual claim.
1.

Objectivity and Verifiability of Shareholder Wealth
Maximization

Schelling points are objective and verifiable points because
anyone desiring to coordinate can observe them and thereby confirm their observability by others. So observed, people coordinate
their activities and confirm coordination by observing others
196

Granted, there is Times Square, Grand Central Station, or perhaps even
Central Park.
197
Professor Schelling noted that he expected poets would sometimes be better
at his coordination games than logicians. See SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 58.
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locating themselves at the Schelling point—just as one can observe another person standing in front of the Empire State Building. Shareholder wealth maximization shares these features.
The notion that a business exists to make money, whether or
not the same is desirable in all cases, is an objective concept.199
Most people understand what it means to attempt to earn money
from various business activities and that understanding is
shared. Similarly, it is verifiable in that there are simple ways to
measure whether the amount of money earned is increasing or
decreasing. In public stock markets with quoted prices, the current capitalized value of a corporation’s future value is, at least
to some extent, verifiable in that price.200 The price of any given
fraction of the corporation’s freely-traded residual claim reflects
that fraction of the corporation’s value to the market as a
whole.201
To be sure, there are lots of metrics that might be objective
and verifiable. Certainly, a corporation could disclose how much
carbon it emits from its operating activities in tons, and any
person—shareholder or otherwise202—who might be interested in
that information would then be able to observe and verify it.
This might make it an equilibrium and perhaps even an optimal
point of corporate coordination. But there are costs associated
with this. Are the metrics right? Do people truly find them useful?203 Again, the benefits of Schelling points flow from their role
in creating a choice where there are multiple equilibria and high
transaction costs. What separates shareholder wealth maximization from other corporate purposes is its contextual intuitiveness.
While it may be true, and perhaps even obviously so, that it
would be good if corporations—and non-corporate actors—
reduced their carbon emissions, it is not obvious why or how a
corporate board of directors and its appointed managers would

199
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implement such a normative good as a purpose.204 Corporate
managers and directors have been implementing shareholder
wealth maximization as a simple, intuitive corporate purpose for
over a century.205
2.

The Contextual Intuitiveness of Shareholder Wealth
Maximization

Schelling points are contextually intuitive. People navigating a context with which they are at least somewhat familiar will
gravitate toward points that “stand out” within the relevant
context. As Professor George Mocsary describes, the Michigan
Supreme Court in Dodge was merely stating expressly what
everyone involved with business associations knew and understood intuitively: the purpose of the corporation is to make money
and the directors and officers should be trying to make money.206
It was apparently so ingrained in the fabric of the business world
at the time that the Dodge court spoke of it as though it was
obvious.207
It would be simple to imagine that shareholder wealth maximization reached this contextual intuitiveness because of the
justifications that emerged from the law-and-economics movement.208 That is, one could imagine early corporations maximizing
shareholder wealth because it was efficient or because it was a
majoritarian desire. But there’s no reason to believe that early
corporations and their predecessors were efficient or desirable at
all.209 As with modern large corporations, early large corporations existed to undertake large, costly, risky and long-term
projects. Thus, they needed lots of capital and needed it from a
larger pool of investors. They already had boards,210 already paid
dividends,211 and already collected money from dispersed and
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largely disinterested investors.212 Primarily due to the latter
feature—dispersed and disinterested investors utterly failing to
exercise any control—they were also thought to be of quite
limited utility.213
As described above, economic theories of incentives would
suggest an intractable problem: managers’ and directors’ incentives are to shirk and potentially steal, and to externalize
corporate costs onto society, while shareholders’ incentives are to
remain rationally ignorant of shirking, stealing, or anything else
managers and directors may be doing.214 If shareholder wealth
maximization is to persist, then, it must have economic value. As
everyone from Professor Coase forward explained: the firm will
work, or not, based on whether the increased productivity associated with doing things as a firm exceeds the costs associated with
doing things as a firm.215 Again, though, no individual shareholder can guess in advance, nor can any director or manager
credibly commit in advance that she will be such a good director
or manager that the firm’s productivity gains will always exceed
all relevant costs, including agency costs associated with having
managers and directors. But since shareholders continue to
invest, and managers and directors continue to permit public
stock to be outstanding, there has to be some mechanism holding
the things together: the Schelling point that is the shareholder
wealth maximization norm.
Managers do not have any way to credibly communicate to
the shareholders their intention to be good central contracting
agents, and directors struggle to credibly communicate their
intention, and ability, to be good monitors. Of course, all managers and directors will promise to efficiently run the corporation
and not shirk or steal, but that promise is hardly believable in
the abstract, because they have great incentive to shirk and steal
and shareholders have neither the power nor incentive to police
them.216 Managers and directors may even be incentivized to
oversell their ability to be loyal and competent, because then they
would have an even better chance of escaping with ill-gotten
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gains. Yet again, a well-constructed hypothetical bargain grinds
to a halt because there is no way to credibly communicate, there
are information asymmetries, and it is really hard for the shareholders to exercise any true role in governance.217 The surplus
that might be created by striking the bargain is dependent upon
all of these costs and benefits equilibrating.218
As a matter of description of the corporate landscape, the
existing costs and benefits must have equilibrated somehow. The
manner in which they do is measured by adherence to the
Schelling point: everybody observes the norm that the managers’
and directors’ duties are to make their primary ends the increase
in the value of the corporation, and therefore, the residual claim.
Managers and directors recognize that this is what they are
supposed to be doing, while shareholders recognize that this is
what they should expect the managers and directors to do. The
shareholder wealth maximization norm solves the coordination
and conflict problems219 and creates credibility for managers and
directors promising shareholders to act in their financial interest.
3.

Putting the Default in Default Rules

Borrowed from contract law, along with the nexus-of-contracts
metaphor, contractarian corporate law proposes that corporate
law is a set of off-the-rack default rules that the parties can
change if they desire.220 Private ordering is supposed to best
permit the people with knowledge and information to put it to
use in the most efficient ways in the market. The aggregation of
these private choices, whether they are individually rational or
not, underpin basic theories of economic efficiency and rational
utility maximization.221
If the general idea of default rules is that they facilitate the
efficiency gains of private ordering, then how should the rules be
selected? The simple answer is that default rules should reflect
what a majority of parties in the relevant space would want if
they could costlessly bargain. While the law-and-economics schol217
Again, the hypothetical nature of the bargain allows the device to ignore
these costs, but this Article’s goal is to explain the results of the hypothetical
bargain by illustrating how real bargains can overcome the impediments preventing
the hypothetical ones.
218
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219
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220
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221
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ars have made a formidable case that separation of ownership
and control, fiat authority, and shareholder wealth maximization
are majoritarian in nature, Professor Ann M. Lipton, among
others, has recently argued, quite cogently, that the majority
may be splintering.222
If selecting legal default rules by divining majority preference is going to be the framework for selecting and reforming
corporate law rules, Professor Lipton’s analysis perhaps
foreshadows a shift toward the long-desired—in some quarters—
stakeholderist model, or something else. If, on the other hand,
legal default rules are selected by careful observation of the
coordination points that have been successful in the past, then it
becomes less clear that a stakeholderist model or some other
reform is appropriate. Majoritarian preferences, hypothesized,
stated, or revealed, are inevitably context-specific. So, too, are
Schelling points. The shareholder wealth maximization Schelling
point cannot, a priori, reflect that the majority prefers it or that
it is optimal, but alternative models cannot, a priori, premise
their proposed superiority without a clear understanding of how
context-specific coordination around shareholder wealth maximization contributes to the value of investing in public corporations.
It does so by providing a point of agreement superior to not
participating in the bargain by permitting both sides to make a
credible commitment to one another. This is true even though
managers and directors have fiat authority to run the corporation, even when shareholders remain rationally ignorant of most
exercises of that authority. Shareholders will put up with
managers and directors having practically unreviewable authority, as long as they appear to be using that authority toward the
ultimate end of shareholder wealth. If they start expressly
stating they intend to allocate all potential shareholder wealth to
other constituencies, they will have, as Professor Bainbridge put
it, slain the golden goose.223 This illustrates what makes a
Schelling point a Schelling point: it coordinates bargainers in a
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high-transaction-cost environment. Take away the Schelling point,
and the bargaining process could very easily spin out of control.224
4.

Stickiness—Once a Schelling Point, Always a Schelling Point

One of the interesting features of Schelling points is that
once one is established (by law or agreement or otherwise), it
tends to be even more “focal” than it was in the beginning.225 As
Professor David Friedman pointed out, Schelling’s work suggested that parties would take seemingly inefficient actions—
perhaps even to the point of seeming cognitively-biased—merely
to preserve the past point of agreement.226
As conceded here, viewing shareholder wealth maximization
as a Schelling point does not answer the question, “is shareholder
wealth maximization the optimal rule?” In fact, this Article
makes the distinct concession that shareholder wealth maximization may not be the optimal rule in all cases. Its potential for
mischief has been robustly theorized, if not completely empirically shown. Other interests matter, moral questions abound,
and aesthetic preferences have value, too.227 A concession this
Article wishes to elicit from those perhaps considering a normative shift away is that shareholder wealth maximization has
an emergent quality and an empirical value that is not always
captured in the contested arguments supporting its downstream
economic efficiency or doctrinal sturdiness. That is, claims about
inefficient outcomes, exception-laden doctrines, and alternative
hypothetical bargains228 do not, and perhaps cannot, fully address
the coordinating power of the norm. The coordinating power of
the norm came first, then the law enshrined it, and now
224
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investors’ expectations for it are sticky. This suggests, at
minimum, that shareholder wealth maximization is creating
value, even if it is not creating or capturing all potential value.
V. CONCLUSION
Shareholder wealth maximization’s justifications and critiques
focus on its economic efficiency or lack thereof, its doctrinal
sturdiness or lack thereof, and its potential ability to create
social value or impede desired social reforms. This debate takes
place downstream—that is, it takes place in a world where shareholder wealth maximization is at least mostly understood to be
the governing norm and the animating principle of legal duties of
managers and directors. Critics have robustly shown that the
downstream benefits allegedly attributable to shareholder wealth
maximization are more elusive than they should be, even if they
are not illusory. This Article provides a different view of the
question. It argues that the shareholder wealth maximization
norm is an emergent, privately created coordinating point that
arose from a high-transaction-cost bargain. That is, the shareholder wealth maximization norm is a Schelling point. Since the
participants in the corporate bargain need each other to generate
a surplus from economic activity, but cannot communicate with
one another in a low-cost way, they need a way to solve this
coordination problem. A Schelling point is an intuitive, imperfect
way to solve a problem, so the bargainers may be expected to find
each other there. The Schelling point in this bargain is a commitment from managers and directors to maximize the financial
value of the firm, and therefore maximize the shareholders’
wealth. Shareholder wealth maximization may not always be
optimal, but it is reliably useful.

